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United Mine Workers v. Pennington,1 Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,2 and Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,3 establish that labor/manage-
ment agreements may be protected by an exemption that derives
from a subjective balancing of labor and antitrust policy. Once the
statutory and non-statutory exemptions are found to be unavaila-
ble to protect an agreement from antitrust scrutiny, the courts
must still determine the appropriate analysis under which the la-
bor/management agreements are to be reviewed.
Under traditional antitrust analysis an agreement that affects
trade is analyzed under one of two approaches to determine if it is
an unreasonable restraint and therefore violative of the antitrust
laws. The first of these is the "rule of reason" analysis in which all
of the circumstances of the case, including the competitive conse-
quences of the restraint and any justifications for it are assessed by
the court.4 The second is the "per se" analysis. Under this ap-
proach, certain types of agreements, because of their "pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." These agreements include such ac-
tivities as concerted refusals to deal (or "group boycotts") and
price-fixing arrangements.
The Supreme Court has never addressed directly the issue of
* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.; Former Chairman of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
** Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.
1. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
2. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
3. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
4. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
5. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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what standard of analysis should be employed in the labor/anti-
trust cases where labor's exemptions to the antitrust laws are
found to be unavailable. The lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court on this issue has created much debate and confusion among
the lower courts.
It is not yet clear whether non-exempt labor conduct is always to
be evaluated under the rule of reason standard or whether either
standard may apply depending on the nature of the violation al-
leged and the degree of judicial experience with the particular type
of restraint. It is clear, however, that the courts are at least uncom-
fortable in subjecting labor/management agreements to the strict
antitrust per se standards. The majority of cases that address this
issue do not appear to apply traditional antitrust analysis. A nota-
ble exception however is the recent Fourth Circuit opinion handed
down May 17th, 1982, National Electrical Contractors Association
v. National Constructors Association.
6
In the area of professional sports several courts have refused to
apply the per se analysis to agreements arising in collective bar-
gaining settings where the statutory and non-statutory exemptions
did not protect the agreement. For example, in Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League7 and Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,8 the
courts considered the "unique characteristics" of the professional
football industry and concluded that the challenged agreements
should be analyzed not under a per se rule but under the rule of
reason.
The per se approach was also considered in the collective bar-
gaining area in a non-sports context by the Ninth Circuit in Acker-
man-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Constructors Association.'
In that case, the court considered the appropriateness of applying
the per se rule to collective bargaining agreements requiring all
employers to provide negotiated insurance benefits through a des-
ignated insurance carrier. The court did not reach the issue of
whether the non-statutory exemption protected the agreement
from antitrust scrutiny but concluded that the alleged conduct did
not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.10
It is unclear from these opinions whether the per se analysis is
inappropriate in all labor cases. In Smith, Mackey, and Ackerman-
6. 678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982).
7. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
8. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
9. 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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Chillingworth, the courts emphasized that the per se approach was
inappropriate not only because of the unique nature of the markets
but also because of the types of agreements considered in the
cases. Specifically, the courts distinguished the challenged agree-
ments from the "typical" concerted refusal to deal or group boy-
cott arrangements that have been classified as per se illegal, and
indicated approval of the antitrust precept that a per se rule
should only be applied where the courts have sufficient experience
with the arrangement in question to merit the conclusion that "the
rule of reason - the normal mode of analysis - can be dispensed
with.""
Whether these decisions are further evidence of judicial defer-
ence to the labor laws when collective agreements are challenged
under the antitrust laws, or simply an application of traditional
antitrust concepts is unclear. While these decisions indicate that a
per se analysis will not necessarily be applied to non-exempt labor
conduct, they do not compel the conclusion that the rule of reason
approach should always be applied.
One resolution of these cases may be that the rule of reason
standard may be applicable where the alleged restraint on compe-
tition cannot be readily characterized as a traditional type of per
se restraint but that where arguably more traditional restraints are
involved, such as group boycotts and price fixing, the courts may
be willing to apply the traditional antitrust principles in a labor
setting, even if it means the application of the more stringent per
se rule.
The Second Circuit has suggested, however, that the rule of rea-
son is the appropriate analysis although the court did not address
directly the issue of whether a per se approach or rule of reason
analysis should be applied in a collective bargaining setting. In
Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union," the court
considered the limited question of whether the district court erred
in finding that plaintiffs' damages were proximately caused by a
wrongful injunction action, and not by an unlawful section 8(e)
agreement which plaintiffs had alleged as being violative of the
Sherman Act. Although the court found that the district court
should have considered the antitrust claim on the merits, it re-
jected plaintiffs' contention that the court should find the unlawful
section 8(e) arrangement non-exempt and that defendants' group
11. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d at 1181.
12. 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
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boycott arrangement embodied in that agreement was a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws. The Circuit Court stated that its prior
finding that the agreement violated section 8(e) did not dispose of
the non-statutory exemption issue and that "even if the 'nonstatu-
tory' exemption does not apply, there is at least a substantial ques-
tion whether a per se approach under the antitrust laws is applica-
ble in the case of a non-exempt labor activity.""3
The court remanded the case for further consideration of these
issues and indicated its preference for the rule of reason approach,
quoting Professor Handler:
This brings us to the question of antitrust liability when union activity is
held to be non-exempt. The principal danger of these recent rulings is that
a finding of antitrust liability will automatically be made whenever the chal-
lenged conduct is held to be non-exempt. This would be a per se approach
with a vengeance. Arrangements may fall outside the scope of mandatory
bargaining and yet have no adverse effect on competition. We still must find
whether the agreement restrains trade and whether the restraint is unrea-
sonable. A fair reading of Jewel Tea . .. satisfies me that the Court in-
tended that there be a full-scale rule of reason inquiry in every instance in
which a non-exempt activity is claimed to be in violation of antitrust."'
The Second Circuit noted again without discussion or explana-
tion its apparent preference for applying the rule of reason in
Berman Enterprises v. Local 333, United Marine Division, Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association.5 Berman involved a chal-
lenge to a collective bargaining agreement between a longshore-
men's union representing harbor vessel employees and a multi-
employer bargaining unit which barred the towing of any vegetable
oil barge of designated capacity having less than two crewmen and
required affiliates of member companies to comply with the terms
of the agreement. Affiliated non-member employees charged that
the agreement violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal,
the court stated that "even if the vegetable oil and the affiliates
clauses do not fall within the labor exemption, there was no proof
of an antitrust violation under the rule of reason which would be
applicable here.""
The Third Circuit, however, has expressly rejected Professor
Handler's view that there be a full-scale rule of reason inquiry in
13. Id. at 802.
14. Id. at 802 n.8 (quoting Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 Arri-
TRUST L.J. 233, 239-240 (1971)).
15. 644 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
16. Id. at 936.
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every instance in which a non-exempt activity is claimed to be in
violation of the antitrust laws. In Consolidated Express Inc. v.
New York Shipping Association (Conex),'7 and Larry V. Muko,
Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Building and Construction
Trades Council (Muko II),8 the court held that the proper
method of analysis is to determine the availability of the non-stat-
utory labor exemption separately and then to proceed with conven-
tional antitrust scrutiny of the complaint, which may include ap-
plication of the per se rule where the facts warrant its application.
Conex involved an agreement between the International Long-
shoremen's Association (ILA) and a group of shippers in the New
York area, New York Shipper's Association (NYSA), that required
that the work of consolidating cargo for container shipment be
done at dockside by Longshoremen. Two employers who had been
engaged in the off-dock consolidation of freight filed charges with
the NLRB which found a section 8(e) violation.
On the basis of that finding, plaintiffs argued successfully that
the agreement constituted a "group boycott" and was not pro-
tected by antitrust scrutiny by any labor exemption. Accordingly,
the court found the arrangement unlawful per se under the anti-
trust statutes. The court stated that:
The justification offered for application of the rule of reason is the need to
recognize, in the antitrust context, labor's legitimate interest in the collec-
tive bargaining process. That interest, however, is precisely the same one
that must be taken into account in determining the scope of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. A holding that the exemption does not apply embod-
ies a judgment that considerations of labor policy are outweighed by the
anticompetitive dangers posed by the challenged restraint. The proposed
use of the rule of reason would, therefore, simply be an invitation to the
court or jury to reweigh under a different label the question of the nonstatu-
tory exemption.' 9
The court in Conex relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States
20
held that there was no justification for affording labor agreements
special treatment once it has been found that they are non-exempt
from antitrust scrutiny. In Professional Engineers, the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the social benefits
17. 602 F.2d 494 (3rd Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S.
902 (1980), on remand, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. 670 F.2d 421 (3rd. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229-30 (1982).
19. 602 F.2d at 523-24.
20. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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supposedly derived from a price-fixing arrangement could be con-
sidered by the court in a rule of reason analysis as a counterbal-
ance to the anti-competitive effect of the agreement. In Conex the
Third Circuit reasoned that labor policy considerations could not
be reviewed in determining the applicability of the per se rule once
the exemption issue has been decided because, according to the
court, these considerations are social or public interest considera-
tions and do not relate to the competitive balance contemplated by
the rule of reason.
The court, while applying a per se analysis, fashioned a new de-
fense to treble damages to accommodate special labor policy con-
siderations. The court determined that treble damage awards
should not be imposed if defendants can affirmatively show that
they meet the requirements of a "good faith" defense. The court
reasoned that the imposition of the full range of antitrust remedies
because of an unlawful agreement, but one reached in good faith
and on the reasonable belief that it was lawful, was unfair and too
disruptive of the goals of the national labor policy.
Thus, despite its statement that a rule of reason approach would
be redundant where the court has already considered the affected
labor policies in its non-statutory analysis, the Third Circuit's
treble damages defense appears to be an attempt by the court to
temper the results it felt compelled to reach under the dictates of
Professional Engineers and ensure that proper consideration
would be given to labor policy. Viewed in this matter, the Third
Circuit's approach appears to be another attempt by the courts to
accommodate the conflicting national labor and antitrust policies."1
In Muko II, the Third Circuit explicitly reaffirmed its holding in
Conex that the proper method of analysis is to determine the issue
of non-statutory labor exemption separately and then to proceed
with conventional antitrust scrutiny of the complaint, including
the application of the per se rule where the facts justify its applica-
tion. The court acknowledged again the Supreme Court's position
that "public interest" considerations, such as the advancement of
labor policy, are not proper subjects for examination under the
rule of reason. According to the court it is unnecessary, if not im-
proper, to weigh "labor's legitimate interest in the collective bar-
gaining process" twice-once in determining the labor exemption
21. The court in Feather v. United Mine Workers, 494 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Pa. 1980),
following Conex, denied treble damage liability where an agreement preventing coal compa-
nies from subcontracting certain work was found to violate § 8(e).
Vol. 21:401
Non-Exempt Activities
and again in deciding the antitrust liability question. The court,
however, after reaffirming its adoption of this mode of analysis in
the labor antitrust area, proceeded to interpret the facts before it
in a manner understandable only, as the dissent candidly stated, in
an approach that "must stem from its discomfort with the applica-
tion of traditional antitrust rules in the labor context."22
In Muko II, Long John Silver's, Inc., (Silver's) which operates
fast-food restaurants in several markets contracted with Muko, a
non-union general contractor, to build its first outlet in Pittsburgh.
During construction of the restaurant, two labor organizations
picketed the site and urged customers of the restaurant not to pa-
tronize it because the chain used contractors who paid substandard
wages. Silver's arranged a meeting with the Building Trades Coun-
cils and according to the jury's findings, entered into an agreement
with the Councils to use only union contractors certified by the
Councils. Thereafter, Silver's employed only unionized general
contractors to build its Pittsburgh-area restaurants.
Muko filed suit against Silver's and the Councils alleging that
the defendants had entered into an agreement to award the con-
tracts for the construction of Silver's restaurants in the Pittsburgh
area only to union contractors. Muko alleged that this constituted
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act 23 and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.2'
Following a jury trial the district court granted the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the Third Circuit re-
versed and remanded the case for a new trial in which the jury
found that the defendants had reached an agreement, outside the
labor exemption, to exclude Muko as a competitor for Silver's con-
struction work. The jury concluded, however, that the agreement
was not an unreasonable restraint of trade and the court entered
judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the court considered
whether the trial judge erred as a matter of law in instructing the
jury to apply the rule of reason, rather than the per se standard, to
the agreement at issue.
The principal reason relied upon by the majority for applying a
rule of reason analysis is its view that the circumstances before it
did not constitute a "classic" group boycott typically held to be
unreasonable per se. The majority stated that Muko was not a case
22. 670 F.2d at 439 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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in which a competitor, through concerted action with a supplier or
customer, attempts to cut another, horizontal competitor out of
the marketplace.
As noted by the dissent, the agreement in Muko is indistinguish-
able from similar agreements which have been placed in the per se
category. In the trial below the jury found that Silver's had entered
into an agreement with the Trades Councils to exclude Muko (and
other non-union contractors) from a market. The Trades Councils
are representatives of union labor and Muko, a non-union contrac-
tor, must be viewed as the representative of non-union labor, the
object of the agreement not to deal.
Accordingly, as stated in the dissent, the majority's analysis is
inconsistent with its own recognition that traditional antitrust
principles must apply once the non-statutory labor exemption is
found to be inapplicable and is inconsistent with the court's hold-
ing in Conex. As stated candidly by the dissent, the only explana-
tion for this analysis is the court's discomfort with the application
of traditional antitrust rules in the labor context.
In the recent case of James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated General
Contractors,25 the Sixth Circuit struggled with the proper accom-
modation between labor law and antitrust laws. Snyder involved
allegations that a group of large employers had agreed with unions
to impose a collective bargaining agreement's wage scale upon
smaller non-signatory employers in an attempt to drive them out
of business. The court acknowledged that if defendants had agreed
with the unions to impose a wage scale upon plaintiffs, the agree-
ment would not be exempt from the antitrust laws. The court
noted, however, that denying the exemption does not mean that
there is an antitrust violation. The court stated further that in or-
der to establish an antitrust violation arising from a union's com-
mitment to. employers to establish an industry-wide wage scale, it
must be shown not only that defendants and unions had agreed to
impose wages upon plaintiffs, but also that defendants had entered
into this agreement with the intent to injure plaintiffs' businesses,
i.e., with predatory intent. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld
the trial court's grant of a motion for a directed verdict because of
plaintiffs' failure to establish either an agreement or predatory in-
tent. Thus, it appears that the courts continue to incorporate labor
policy considerations both in determining the exemption issue and
25. 677 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3175-76 (U.S.
Sept. 21, 1982) (No. 82-148).
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in establishing the prima facie elements of certain antitrust
violations.
Last month the Fourth Circuit, in National Electrical Contrac-
tors Association v. National Constructors Association (NECA) 26
applied the traditional per se antitrust analysis to find illegal an
agreement in the collective bargaining area. NECA involved a fund
established purportedly to defray the cost that the National Elec-
trical Contractors Association (NECA) incurred in the negotiation
of area agreements that formed the basis of most electrical con-
tracts in the construction industry. In addition, the fund was in-
tended to be used for the general promotion of the industry. The
National Constructors Association (NCA), another multi-employer
association engaged in electrical industry collective bargaining,
challenged the fund under the antitrust laws. The plaintiffs' com-
plaint alleged that NECA and the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW) had agreed to impose the fund on all
employers (whether they were NECA members or not) as a pre-
condition of obtaining a labor agreement with the IBEW. This, the
plaintiffs argued, constituted an unlawful price-fixing arrangement
that had the purpose and effect of eliminating NCA members'
competitive advantage over NECA employers.
The Court of Appeals held that the agreement which adds a one
percent charge to all IBEW construction contracts falls within the
definition of price-fixing. The court stated that taking the addi-
tional percentage of labor costs from non-NECA contractors
removes a competitive advantage beneficial to the public and inter-
feres with the market forces that set the price of electrical con-
struction contracts, a practice illegal per se under the Sherman
Act. Relying on traditional per se concepts the court held that the
mere existence of a price-fixing agreement establishes the defen-
dant's illegal purpose because "the aim and result of every price-
fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of
competition. 2 7 Accordingly, the court dispensed with a specific
finding of anticompetive purpose and effect.
The dissent argued that the "blind" application of the per se
rule against price-fixing ignores the realities of the case and consti-
tutes an extension of the per se rule. The dissent would follow the
approach in Smitty Baker Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers28 and
26. 678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982).
27. Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927)).
28. 620 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980).
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Snyder which requires that:
To amount to an antitrust violation the agreement must be rooted in an
anti-competitive purpose, and must effect an anti-competitive result, as evi-
denced by action 'ruining' a competitor's business or driving him 'out of
business.' Unless there is such an agreement between the labor organization
and the non-labor group and such an anti-competitive result, there is no
conspiracy actionable under the antitrust laws.2
It is still unclear whether non-exempt labor conduct will be ana-
lyzed under the rule of reason or whether the courts will utilize
traditional antitrust analysis including the application of the more
stringent per se rule where the facts justify its application. The
Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers may make it
more difficult for the courts to openly consider labor policy justifi-
cations in applying rule of reason analysis to non-exempt labor
conduct. Although the courts have acknowledged the limitations
imposed by Professional Engineers, it appears that the courts are
still struggling to integrate labor policy considerations in their ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to non-exempt labor conduct.
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the Seminar, the text of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society0 be-
came available wherein the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that has not
been subjected to significant antitrust scrutiny. Although courts
may continue to struggle to integrate labor policy considerations in
their application of the antitrust laws to non-exempt labor con-
duct, this decision along with the Supreme Court's decision in Pro-
fessional Engineers will make it more difficult for those courts to
do so openly.
29. Id. at 431-32.
30. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
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